




















READING BETWEEN THE RED LINES: 




                                                      






For the least developed countries and small island states, excluding a stand-alone 
provision for loss and damage in the Paris Agreement constituted a red line, one that the 
negotiating groups refused to cross.  For the developed world—and the United States in 
particular—any possible pathway to liability and compensation a loss and damage 
provision might introduce was an equally bright and impassable red line.  In the end, 
negotiators remained steadfast.  Both lines appeared more or less unscathed and 
compromise language emerged from the Paris Outcome.1  This article describes the 
process leading up to the Outcome, the language included in the loss and damage 
provision and its implications, and identifies lingering questions that remain.  In 
particular, the absence of a clear funding stream, the treatment of climate-related 
displacement, and the outstanding questions regarding compensation for climate impacts 
are not completely resolved.  These are, perhaps, the most compelling, confounding, and 
impactful elements of the loss and damage debate thus far.  Based on the conclusion of 
the Paris COP, they might continue to animate the loss and damage discussion for the 
foreseeable future. 
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1. The Multi-Decade Road to Paris - in Brief 
1.1  Understanding Loss and Damage 
Loss and damage proposals become more imperative as our multi-decade attempts to 
reduce emissions and support adaptation continue to founder.  Though the UNFCCC does 
not identify a settled definition of the compound term, ‘negative effects of climate 
variability and climate change that people have not been able to cope with or adapt to’ 
serves as a working definition.2  Loss and damage proposals attempt to address the 
impacts of climate change that are not avoided or unavoidable.3  In sum, it describes the 
impacts of slow-onset events (such as ocean acidification, desertification, and sea level 
rise) and non-economic losses (such as the loss of cultural heritage and displacement), 
among other things.  Limited funding, technology, and/or institutional capacity may also 
result in loss and damage, as those impacts are not avoided through adaptation efforts that 
might be available to wealthier, better-equipped, or better insured communities.4  Further, 
the losses and damages experienced by the most vulnerable countries constitute 
                                                      
1 The Paris Outcome describes the COP Decision Text and its Annex, the draft Paris Agreement, which 
countries are expected to ratify on April 22, 2016. 
2 See Alex Durand and Saleemul Huq, ‘A Simple Guide to the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss 
and Damage,’ ICCCAD, < http://www.icccad.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/A-simple-guide-to-the-
Warsaw-International-Mechanism.pdf> (last visited 1/20/16). 
3 For a general discussion of varying definitions of ‘loss and damage’ and the limits of adaptation, see 
Maxine Burkett, ‘Loss and Damage’, 4 Climate Law 119 (2014).  
4 Ilona Millar, Catherine Gascoigne, and Elizabeth Caldwell, ‘Making Good the Loss,’ in Threatened 
Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, edited by Michael B. Gerrard 
and Gregory Wannier (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 437. 
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significant percentages of their GDP and introduce significant setbacks in development.5  
Loss and damage is, in short, evidence of the collateral effects of inadequate or failed 
mitigation and the limits of adaptation. 
Core to appeals for loss and damage are recognition of ethical and legal 
obligations that elements of a mechanism would help to advance.  As I have explained 
elsewhere, loss and damage, and particularly its reparative function, would assist 
vulnerable countries to cope with disasters for which they are least responsible.6  While 
loss and damage provisions regarding risk management and risk transfer could address 
disaster prevention and the need for rapid disbursement of funds, the appeals for 
compensation and rehabilitation reflect a strong sense among those most vulnerable that 
emerging economies and the developed world has a legal and moral obligation to assist in 
their survival.  Arguments regarding ethical obligations flow from their 
disproportionately low current and historical contribution to the crisis—particularly 
relative to the small handful that constitute the majority of current and historical 
emissions.  Arguments regarding legal obligations stem from provisions within the 
Framework Convention and follow-on protocols7 as well as existing international law 
principles such as polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.8 
Because of their unique vulnerability to climate change and their limited wealth 
and adaptive capacity, countries like the small island developing states have been 
particularly vocal advocates for a strong and coherent loss and damage mechanism under 
the Framework Convention.9  Specifically, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
emerged as the negotiating group to introduce early versions of a loss and damage regime 
as many as 25 years ago.  Initially a proposal seeking insurance-related action, the AOSIS 
proposal evolved into a three-part mechanism seeking: (i) an insurance component to 
help vulnerable countries share and transfer risk from increasingly severe weather events; 
(ii) a rehabilitation and compensatory component to address progressive negative impacts 
of climate change for which measurable loss and damage is unavoidable, including slow-
onset events and unprecedented phenomena like climate-induced migration; and, (iii) a 
risk management component to promote risk assessment and management, as well as 
                                                      
5 See Ilona Millar, Catherine Gascoigne, and Elizabeth Caldwell, ‘Making Good the Loss,’ in Threatened 
Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, edited by Michael B. Gerrard 
and Gregory Wannier (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 437. 
6 See Burkett, ‘Loss and Damage’, 4 Climate Law 119 (2014); see also Burkett, ‘Climate Reparations’, 10 
Melbourne J. Int’l L. 509 (2009). 
7 Ilona Millar, Catherine Gascoigne, and Elizabeth Caldwell, ‘Making Good the Loss,’ in Threatened 
Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, edited by Michael B. Gerrard 
and Gregory Wannier (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 438 (citing UNFCCC, Art. 
4(8), Kyoto Protocol, Art. 3(14)).   
8 Other guiding principles include principles of equity and intergenerational equity and international 
solidarity, among others.  See Alliance of Small Island States, Proposal to the AWG-LCA, ‘Multi-Window 
Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts’ (2008) (on file with author).  For 
further discussion of international law principles relevant to the compensation component, see discussion 
infra __.  
9 See Maxine Burkett, ‘Climate Reparations’, 10 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 509 (2009) (noting that at the ‘1992 
UN Conference on Environment and Development, Small Island Developing States (‘SIDS’) were 
recognised as a special case for both environment and development. Their ‘small size, limited resources, 
geographic dispersion, and isolation from [international] markets’ make them vulnerable relative to current 
development markers). 
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facilitate and inform the other components of proposal.10  AOSIS understood the three 
components to play ‘different and complementary roles’ and they comprised an 
‘integrated’ and ‘interdependent approach’11 to effective loss and damage governance. 
AOSIS initially viewed its calls of loss and damage as a kind of adaptation 
assistance, which adaptation-related funding might sensibly support.12  Over time, 
however, the inadequacy of adaptation—in theory and in practice—to support loss and 
damage-related impacts and proposals became clear.  The desire to distinguish 
definitively loss and damage from the adaptation regime was a key negotiating matter for 
the Paris COP and its lead up. 
1.2 The Warsaw International Mechanism and the COP21 Buildup  
AOSIS’s appeals for loss and damage continued unabated with notable advances in the 
last five years.  The 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework built on important language in 
the Bali Action Plan regarding enhanced adaptation efforts, including strategies and 
means to address loss and damage.  Cancun’s Decision 1/CP.16 launched the Work 
Programme on Loss and Damage, on which the Durban COP elaborated.  The Doha 
Decision 3/CP.18 was a significant advance as it recognized the need to build on 
‘comprehensive climate risk management approaches and called for advanced 
understanding of non-economic loss and damage, patterns of migration and displacement, 
and identification and development of approaches to rehabilitation.13  The Doha decision 
mandated the formation of an institutional arrangement to conduct the above.  From that 
mandate, the Warsaw International Mechanism emerged one year later. 
Until the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), loss and damage fell beyond 
the purview of UNFCCC institutions and funding mechanisms.14  The WIM Decision 
2/CP.19 laid out an approach to developing a loss and damage infrastructure. It charged 
the WIM Executive Committee with enhancing knowledge and understanding of 
comprehensive risk management approaches to address loss and damage; strengthening 
dialogues, coordination, coherence, and synergies among relevant stakeholders relative to 
loss and damage; and, enhancing action and support.  A two-year workplan to implement 
the WIM’s mandate was approved at the COP20 in 2014 and, of note, included an action 
area on migration, displacement, and mobility.15  To be sure, the Warsaw International 
Mechanism (WIM) was an interim measure.  It did not have any long-term institutional 
grounding; in other words, it was a mechanism with a confined period of operation, with 
the possibility of renewal.  Further, it did not identify a clear funding stream.  Also 
noteworthy, despite efforts to have the loss and damage provision reflect the ‘beyond 
adaptation’ impacts it is meant to address, the WIM was not created as a stand alone 
mechanism, but rather a mechanism under the Cancun Adaptation Framework.   
                                                      
10 See generally Maxine Burkett, ‘Loss and Damage’, 4 Climate Law 119 (2014), at 124; AOSIS, ‘Loss and 
Damage Briefing’ (2012) (on file with author). 
11 Alliance of Small Island States, Proposal to the AWG-LCA, ‘Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss 
and Damage from Climate Change Impacts’ (2008) (on file with author). 
12 Alliance of Small Island States, Proposal to the AWG-LCA, ‘Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss 
and Damage from Climate Change Impacts’ (2008) (on file with author). 
13 See Maxine Burkett, ‘Loss and Damage’, 4 Climate Law 119 (2014), at 127. 
14 See Maxine Burkett, ‘Loss and Damage’, 4 Climate Law 119 (2014), at 124. 
15 UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.20, ‘Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated’, 
FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.2. 
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It was, however, deemed a qualified victory for its proponents.  Concerns 
regarding the rehabilitation and compensation component of the proposed multi-window 
mechanisms reflected ongoing and strident opposition to the possibility that proponents 
might weave liability for climate impacts into the Framework Convention.  While the EU 
espoused more nuanced approaches to loss and damage, remaining open to its exclusion 
yet mindful of its implications for liability, the United States remained ardently opposed 
to the inclusion of loss and damage wholesale.16  These postures portended the deep 
conflicts in the lead up to the Paris negotiations, particularly regarding liability and 
compensation.17  The United States’ position grew more nuanced; though, like the 
Warsaw meetings, the Paris meetings would see late progress on loss and damage with 
key components left on the cutting room floor. 
2. The Paris Outcome – Article 8 & the Decision Text  
On the road to Paris the most vulnerable nations, the small island developing states, in 
particular, identified a handful of issues that the agreement in Paris must resolve—chief 
among them was inclusion of a stand-alone loss and damage mechanism, distinct from 
adaptation.18  In fact, its inclusion served as a ‘red line’ for AOSIS—without which the 
negotiating group would not accede to the Agreement.  Liability and compensation was a 
red line for developed country parties as well.19  Fear of unlimited liability as part and 
parcel of a stand-alone agreement represented one of the thorniest issues negotiators 
faced, rendering loss and damage among the disputes with the greatest potential to dash 
hopes for a meaningful and binding agreement in Paris.20 
It is difficult to overstate the degree to which loss and damage remained a wedge 
issue leading up to and over the course of the two-week negotiations at Le Bourget.  Loss 
and Damage ‘Die-Ins’21 provided a counter-balance to the sometimes sympathetic yet 
steadfast rhetoric of the Obama Administration—which noted the President’s own island 
roots yet objected to potential legal remedies and, earlier in the negotiations, related 
demands to keep temperature increases to below 1.5˚C. 22  The latter, incidentally, would 
                                                      
16 See Maxine Burkett, ‘Loss and Damage’, 4 Climate Law 119 (2014), at 124. 
17 See discussion of nuanced positions regarding compensation and liability in Maxine Burkett, ‘Loss and 
Damage’, 4 Climate Law 119 (2014), at 129. 
18 See e.g., Alliance of Small Island States, ‘Paris Must Show Global Solidarity to Tackle Climate Change’, 
Nov. 29, 2015, <http://aosis.org/paris-must-show-global-solidarity-to-tackle-climate-change/> (last visited 
1/22/16); Pacific Island Development Forum Secretariat, ‘Suva Declaration on Climate Change’, Sept. 4, 
2015, < http://pacificidf.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PACIFIC-ISLAND-DEVELOPMENT-FORUM-
SUVA-DECLARATION-ON-CLIMATE-CHANGE.v2.pdf> (last visited 22 January 2016). 
19 See Meinhard Doelle, ‘The Paris Agreement: Historic Breakthrough or High Stakes Experiment?,’ 
Forthcoming, Special Issue: 6(1-2) Climate Law (2016) (noting that the U.S and Australia sought keep loss 
and damage out of the agreement altogether, or at least confining it to the narrow WIM mandate). 
20 See e.g., John Upton, ‘Paris Pact May Hinge on “Loss and Damage” Dispute’, Climate Central, Nov. 11, 
2015, at http://www.climatecentral.org/news/dispute-threatens-paris-climate-agreement-19666 (last visited 
20 January 2016). As Upton notes, this fear dissipated some as a published draft Agreement included more 
conciliatory language, including language that would explicitly limit liability claims under the Paris 
Agreement.  
21 Ben Adler, ‘Here’s why the words “loss and damage” are causing such a fuss at the Paris climate talks’, 
Grist, Dec. 8, 2015, at <http://grist.org/climate-energy/heres-why-the-words-loss-and-damage-are-causing-
such-a-fuss-at-the-paris-climate-talks/> (last visited 20 January 2016). 
22 See Tony Dokoupil, ‘Climate change reparations: What does the U.S. owe?’, MSNBC, 2 Dec 2015, at 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/climate-change-reparations-what-does-the-us-owe-1 (last visited 22 January 
2016).   
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inversely and positively impact the severity of climate-related loss and damage if 
achieved.23 
The preceding negotiating drafts reflected this schizophrenia in the negotiations.24  
Though earlier drafts included options to make no reference to loss and damage at all, 
during the COP21 negotiations the United States indicated its openness to including it in 
the Agreement, clearing a path for its inclusion—as long as it did not expose wealthy 
countries to compensation claims.25  Loss and damage advocates, and island negotiators 
in particular, were mindful of wealthy country concerns regarding liability and measured 
compromise language to address it.26  Article 8 of the draft Paris Agreement and 
paragraphs 48 to 52 of the accompanying Decision text—altogether—are the product of 
that compromise.   
Under the Agreement, the Conference of Parties, which can enhance and 
strengthen the WIM in order to address the adverse effects of loss and damage, will guide 
and exercise authority over the mechanism.  The Decision text includes important and 
additional clarifying language.  With respect to migration, notably, the Executive 
Committee will establish a task force to ‘complement, draw upon the work of and 
involve, as appropriate existing bodies and expert groups … to develop recommendations 
for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the 
adverse impacts of climate change.’27  This provision sharply contrasts earlier drafts of 
the proposed Agreement that vacillated between a more fully articulated proposal for a 
climate change displacement facility and no mention of climate-related displacement at 
all.   With regard to the contentious issue of liability and compensation, the Decision Text 
Paragraph 52 states concisely: ‘Article 8 of the Agreement [on Loss and Damage] does 
not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.’28  This language—as 
well as what the Outcome does not include—met the needs for negotiators eager to pass a 
consensus agreement.  It leaves, however, a number of key issues unresolved. 
3. Lingering Questions 
3.1 The Cutting Room Floor 
The loss and damage provisions are notable in that they affirm the Parties’ commitment 
to loss and damage and recognize adaptation’s constraints and the failures of mitigation 
                                                      
23 It ultimately was achieved.  See UNFCCC, ‘Draft Paris Agreement’, Draft decision -/CP.21 
 FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, at Art. 2, available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf>.  
Whether or not this is even feasible given the current state of the climate remains unclear.  Indeed, if 
optimally successful, the loss and damage mechanism might incite the largest emitters to redouble their 
efforts on mitigation as well as finance—which in combination will, in small part, reduce the need for more 
extensive loss and damage responses.   
24 See e.g., http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-10_e_04sep2015t1900_wds.pdf; 
UNFCCC, ‘Draft Paris Agreement’, Draft decision -/CP.21 
 FCCC/CP/2015/L.9;  
25 See e.g., Pilita Clark, ‘COP 21: Small island states hopeful of climate damage deal’, Financial Times, 
Dec. 6, 2015, < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/69856762-9c19-11e5-b45d-
4812f209f861.html#axzz3y10vAzOz> (last visited 22 January 2016) 
26 Lisa Friedman, ‘Obama defends climate diplomacy, back aid for islands’, E&E Reporter, 1 December 
2015, < http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060028763> (last visited 22 January 2016). 
27 UNFCCC, Draft decision -/CP.21, ‘Draft Paris Agreement’, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 12 December 
2015, <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf> (last visited 20 January 2016). 
28 UNFCCC, Draft decision -/CP.21, ‘Draft Paris Agreement’, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 12 December 
2015, <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf> (last visited 20 January 2016). 
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efforts to date.  Further, they are now outside of the adaptation infrastructure, ostensibly 
allowing for discrete management and financing.  Loss and damage requires further 
elaboration, however, to be successful.  Among the key details that the Paris Outcome 
does not resolve is the funding for loss and damage, in addition to the displacement and 
liability concerns discussed in greater detail below.  
With regard to funding, Article 8 does not include any language on how the 
Conference of Parties will finance the cooperative and facilitative actions outlined.  
Further, loss and damage is not included in Article 9, which provides financial resources 
to assist developing countries with mitigation and adaption only.  Earlier drafts included 
this undoubtedly controversial statement of financial support.  The December 5th draft, 
for example, still included support through a Financial Mechanism of the Convention in 
its loss and damage article.29  The article on finance, and related draft Decision text, also 
mentioned the provision of adequate support for loss and damage, with explicit reference 
to supporting the development and implementation of loss and damage strategies.30  Of 
course, this was bracketed language, indicating that, at best, it was ripe for negotiation. 
Like adaptation, loss and damage will require a redoubled effort to buoy the 
institutional advances it made in the negotiations and the final text of the COP Decision 
and draft Agreement.31 
3.2 The Task Force for Climate Change Displacement  
Over the year leading up to the Paris meetings, climate-related displacement32 was 
prominent in draft texts, with the most detailed management approach laid out under the 
UNFCCC to-date.  Earlier drafts of the Paris Agreement included first-time elaboration 
of a ‘climate change displacement coordination facility’ under the proposed loss and 
damage provisions.  The facility would assist with coordinated efforts to address the 
needs of those displaced by climate-related extreme events and plan for organized 
relocation.33  Australia opposed this facility, decrying it as a less effective and efficient 
way to advance meaningful international action vis-à-vis migration and displacement.  
Other formidable parties—including the U.S., the U.K., and France—were open to its 
inclusion, which is, perhaps, why it reemerged as a clear component of the December 10th 
draft Agreement after a brief absence from the immediately preceding drafts.34 
Ultimately, only a task force on climate change displacement resides in the 
paragraph 50 of the Decision Text, indicating displacement’s relegation from the 
priorities the Agreement does include.  It also indicates, perhaps, an additional kind of 
compromise—this time between developed world parties in opposition.  This may 
portend future disagreement on optimal global management of climate-related migration, 
                                                      
29 UNFCCC, Draft decision -/CP.21, ‘Draft Paris Agreement’ FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6, 5 December 2015. 
The November 6th draft also included similar language.  Draft agreement and draft decision on 
workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 
ADP.2015.11 Informal Note, Edited Version of 6 November 2015, Reissued 10 November 2015. 
30 UNFCCC, Draft decision -/CP.21, ‘Draft Paris Agreement’, FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6, Dec. 5, 2015. 
31 See e.g., UNFCCC, Draft Decision -/CP.21, ‘Draft Paris Agreement’, Paragraph 115, available at 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf> (strongly urging significant increase in 
adaptation finance). 
32 [discuss alternate terms used for ccrm] 
33 See e.g., UNFCCC, Draft Paris Agreement, FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6, 5 December 2015. 
34 Oliver Milman, ‘UN drops plan to help move climate-change affected people’, The Guardian, 4 
November 2015, < http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/07/un-drops-plan-to-create-group-
to-relocate-climate-change-affected-people> (last visited 22 January 2016). 
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displacement, and mobility.   If tackled in earnest, however, the task force’s efforts may 
activate critically important work that was already a stated action area for the WIM35 but 
has been, on balance, advanced further by other UN agencies and NGOs thus far.36  There 
is a core coordination role the task force could play.  Further, among the many issues that 
the task force could advance—and, perhaps, resolve—are how best to organize migration 
and planned relocation, how to fund the planning for and movement of individuals and 
communities, how to generate and distribute those funds over time, and how to do all of 
the above in a principled manner.37 
3.3 The Liability and Compensation Row  – Death or Redux 
Compensation has been the wildly contentious ‘C’ word since the heated negotiations 
leading up to the COP19 Warsaw meetings.  It was similarly contentious, and potentially 
derailing, at the Paris meetings as the most vulnerable pressed for inclusion of loss and 
damage in the Agreement.38  While compensation is just one of the three components of 
the AOSIS loss and damage proposal, it has outsized significance because of concerns 
that it could lead to developed world liability for the impacts of current and historic 
emissions. Proponents of loss and damage were not uniform in their insistence on 
compensation.  With best-case emissions scenarios and the extreme weather events 
already experienced and further forecast, however, many loss and damage proponents do 
not wish to foreclose their options to pursue compensation for unavoidable and 
uninsurable climate change impacts.39  Yet, to advance the inclusion of a loss and damage 
provision in the Agreement, the Decision Text explicitly excludes liability and 
compensation claims based on Article 8.  
The final language on liability claims results from earlier—and telling—iterations 
on the nature of that exclusion.  For example, the December 10th draft of the Agreement 
contained an option to include loss and damage but ‘in a manner that does not involve or 
provide a basis for liability or compensation nor prejudice existing rights under 
international law.’40  The exclusion is now firmly placed in Paragraph 52 of the Decision 
                                                      
35 ‘Initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss 
and Damage,’ http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/8805.php (last visited Feb. 
5, 2016) (approved by UNFCC Decision 2/COP.20). 
36 See Jessica Wentz and Michael Burger, ‘Designing a Climate Change Displacement Coordination 
Facility: Key Issues for COP 21’, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, at 6 
<https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-
change/unfccc_climate_change_displacement_coordination_facility.pdf> (last visited 20 January 2016). 
37 On possible functions of a climate displacement facility or task force, see Jessica Wentz and Michael 
Burger, ‘Designing a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility: Key Issues for COP 21’, Sabin 
Center for Climate Change Law, < https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-
change/unfccc_climate_change_displacement_coordination_facility.pdf> (last visited 20 January 2016). 
38 Julie-Ann Richards, ‘Paris climate deal needs solidarity on loss and damage,’ Climate Change News, 11 
November 2015, < http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/25/paris-climate-deal-needs-solidarity-on-
loss-and-damage/> (last visited 20 January 2016) 
39 See generally Maxine Burkett, ‘Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mechanism for 
Small Island States’, 13 Santa Clara J. of Int’l Law 81 (2015); Earth Negotiations Bulletin, ‘Summary of 
the Paris Climate Change Conference: 29 November - 13 December 2015,’ 12(663) International Institute 
for Sustainable Development 1 (2015), at 43,  <http://iisd.ca/climate/cop21/enb> (last visited 22 January 
2016). 
40 UNFCCC, Draft decision -/CP.21, ‘Draft Paris Agreement,’ COP 21 agenda item 4 (b), 10 December 
2015. 
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Text, though absent the language regarding existing rights.  This move and modification 
may, on balance, signal a win for loss and damage advocates.41 
 More than any other element of the Decision Text, however, this paragraph begs 
the question of the COP Decisions’ legal significance.  The relative weight of the 
Decision Text, its relationship to the Agreement, and the binding nature of the Agreement 
itself is relevant to a whole host of issues raised during the negotiations.  This was of 
particular concern for the COP21, as delegates, consistent with the Durban mandate, 
sought to produce a binding agreement in Paris.  The legally binding nature of the 
Agreement is outside of the scope of this article;42 however, to understand the reach of 
Paragraph 52, noting the function of the Decision Text seems imperative.43  In short, 
COP decisions are not legally binding unless there is a ‘hook’ in the Framework 
Convention that gives it legal force.44  There is no identifiable provision in the UNFCCC 
that would lend legal force to the prohibition of claims for compensation based on Article 
8 of the Agreement. 
Further, regardless of nature of the Decision text, many commentators and 
delegates note that there are existing avenues for liability and compensation under 
international law that Paragraph 52 cannot foreclose.45 The no-harm and polluter pays 
principles, for example, are cornerstones of international environmental law, as are 
prohibitions against and compensation for transboundary harm.46  All of these principles, 
                                                      
41 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, ‘Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference: 29 November - 13 
December 2015’, 12(663) International Institute for Sustainable Development 1 (2015), at 43, 
<http://iisd.ca/climate/cop21/enb> (last visited 22 January 2016). 
42 For a careful discussion of legal nature of the Agreement, see Daniel Bodansky, ‘Legally binding versus 
non-legally binding instruments’, in Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime, edited by Scott 
Barrett Carlo Carraro and Jaime de Melo, (London: CEPR Press and Ferdi, 2015). 
43 See Daniel Bodansky, ‘Legally binding versus non-legally binding instruments’, in Towards a Workable 
and Effective Climate Regime, edited by Scott Barrett Carlo Carraro and Jaime de Melo, (London: CEPR 
Press and Ferdi, 2015).  Explaining that an agreement in legally binding terms signals stronger 
commitment, according to Daniel Bodansky, though political agreements can have greater influence on 
country behavior. 
44 See Daniel Bodansky, ‘Legally binding versus non-legally binding instruments’, in Towards a Workable 
and Effective Climate Regime, edited by Scott Barrett Carlo Carraro and Jaime de Melo, (London: CEPR 
Press and Ferdi, 2015). 
45 See e.g., Pilita Clark, ‘COP 21: Small island states hopeful of climate damage deal’, Financial Times, 6 
December 2015, < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/69856762-9c19-11e5-b45d-
4812f209f861.html#axzz3y10vAzOz> (last visited 22 January 2016) (quoting James Fletcher of St. Lucia).  
‘We believe we already have avenues for liability and compensation under international law and 
international agreements.  The discussion going on right now is a discussion among lawyers. How do we 
end up with a text that allays the fears of the US, the EU and other countries that we are creating a 
mechanism for liability and compensation.  And how do you address our concern that we do not give up 
any rights that we presently already have under international agreements.’  Ibid. See also, Ilona Millar, 
Catherine Gascoigne, and Elizabeth Caldwell, ‘Making Good the Loss,’ in Threatened Island Nations: 
Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, edited by Michael B. Gerrard and Gregory 
Wannier (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 438 (citing UNFCCC, Art. 4(8), Kyoto 
Protocol, Art. 3(14)) (citing relevant provisions in the International Law Commission, ‘Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, U.N. ILC, 53d Sess. (2001)). 
46 See UNFCCC, UNFCCC Preamble, FCCC/INFORMAL/84; see also Report of the International Law 
Commission, 53rd Session, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, with Commentary, 2001, A/56/10;  Christopher Schwarte and Will Frank, ‘The International 
Law Association’s Legal Principles on Climate Change and Climate Liability Under Public International 
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and others proposed, are relevant to the circumstances of global climate change.47  
Nonetheless, some developing country delegates made their concerns regarding the spirit 
and text of Paragraph 52 clear.  Nicaragua and Bolivia, in particular, bemoaned the 
presence of language attempting to delimit rights to compensation and access to ‘climate 
justice.’48   Nicaragua’s dissenting view was not given at the final plenary, suggesting 
that this and related issues might reemerge in the near term.   
Based on the above, the ability for Parties to pursue liability claims through other 
avenues or by revisiting the COP21 Decision does not appear to be at stake.  What is at 
stake, however, is the trust and solidarity-building between negotiating blocs that the loss 
and damage compromises may have inaugurated.  Article 8 and accompanying 
paragraphs were the product of hard-fought conciliation between the highest emitters and 
the most vulnerable, with least developed countries and small island states deferring 
complete satisfaction with the text for global consensus in Paris. While there is nothing 
that is legally foreclosing future discussions of liability and compensation, there may be 
substantial political ramifications that can impede follow-on decision-making. 
4. Conclusion 
With COP21 negotiations well in the rearview, the enormity of the task at hand is 
abundantly clear. The extreme events facing the most exposed and least equipped to 
manage them dwarf the notable successes in Paris.  Achieving a stand-alone loss and 
damage provision was one of those successes, to be sure, though it was just a foothold.  
The future action it enables will determine its actual significance.  In the meantime, there 
are real housekeeping details to larger definitional challenges that the WIM will need to 
tackle now with its broadened and weightier mandate—a mandate that came on the heels 
of noted concern with its limited progress on implementation of the two-year workplan.49  
The definitional challenges involve the very attribution of an extreme weather event to 
past anthropogenic emissions,50 a foundational determination for loss and damage.   
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 11 
The small island states are clear-eyed about the work needed to advance loss and 
damage and the WIM.  They also justifiably paused to celebrate the fortitude, coupled 
with diplomacy, that resulted in an ‘historic agreement.’51 Indeed, moving forward, the 
issues unresolved—those that continue to occupy the space between the two red lines—
will require a similar mix of fortitude and diplomacy. 
                                                                                                                                                              
can support policymakers by indicating the relative, up to date contribution of risk drivers—including 
climatic ones—to overall risk, which is eventually the determinant for loss and damage). 
51 Alliance of Small Island States, ‘Closing Statement Paris Agreement,’ 12 December 2015, 
<http://aosis.org/closing-statement-paris-agreement/> (last visited 22 January 2016). 
View publication stats
